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Abstract
We present a rational analysis of curiosity, proposing that peo-
ple’s curiosity is driven by seeking stimuli that maximize their
ability to make appropriate responses in the future. This per-
spective offers a way to unify previous theories of curiosity
into a single framework. Experimental results confirm our
model’s predictions, showing how the relationship between cu-
riosity and confidence can change significantly depending on
the nature of the environment.
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Introduction
In 1928, upon returning from a vacation, Alexander Fleming,
who was a professor of Bacteriology at St. Mary’s Hospital
in London, noticed how a mold floating in one of his dirty
petri dishes held the surrounding bacteria at bay. This pe-
culiar event led him to develop a hypothesis that would be
a prelude to the development of penicillin. The history of
science abounds with incidents in which an event piqued the
curiosity of a scientist thereby leading to important discover-
ies (other examples include Curie, Faraday, and Planck). For
this reason, intellectual curiosity has long been recognized as
the essence of science. In fact, Herbert Simon famously titled
a 1992 talk given at Carnegie Mellon as ‘The cat that curios-
ity couldn’t kill’ and described curiosity to be not only the
beginning of all science, but also its end (Gobet, 2016).
Considering how important curiosity is to scientific dis-
coveries and many other aspects of cognition, it is surpris-
ing that our understanding of curiosity as a psychological
phenomenon remains quite limited (Simon, 2001; Gottlieb
et al., 2013; Kidd & Hayden 2015). Encouragingly, the field
has seen a revived interest in curiosity in recent years with
psychologists and neuroscientists beginning concentrated ef-
forts to study curiosity systematically (Kang et al, 2009; Gru-
ber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2013; Law et al., 2016; Walin,
O’Grady & Xu, 2016). However, much previous work on cu-
riosity has either focused on defining a taxonomy for curiosity
or providing a mechanistic explanation of curiosity (Kidd &
Hayden, 2015). This means that while we have made some
progress describing the psychological processes involved in
human curiosity, we have not satisfactorily provided an ex-
planation of the purpose and function of curiosity. For exam-
ple, a commonly held notion about the function of curiosity is
that it motivates learning (Loewenstein, 1994; Kidd & Hay-
den, 2015). Although it is easy to say that learning is the goal
of curiosity, this is not very precise in its meaning. How does
curiosity facilitate learning? Why does it do so?
In light of this, in this paper we present a rational anal-
ysis of curiosity in the spirit of Anderson (1990) and Marr
(1982) with the goal of providing a purposive explanation of
curiosity. Our work shows that a rational analysis can pre-
dict many aspects of curiosity without making assumptions
about its mechanisms. We start by defining an abstract rep-
resentation of the problem that curiosity solves and making
a small number of assumptions about the nature of the envi-
ronment. Following that, we explore the optimal solution to
this problem in light of these assumptions. Our theory posits
that people are curious about stimuli that maximally increase
the usefulness of their current knowledge. Depending on the
structure of the environment, the stimuli that maximize this
value can either be ones that are completely novel or that are
of intermediate complexity. As a consequence, our rational
analysis provides a way to unite previously distinct theories
of curiosity into a single framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first re-
view previous theories of curiosity and then introduce our ra-
tional model of curiosity. Following that, we show how our
model offers support to previous distinct accounts of curios-
ity thereby unifying them in a single model. We then conduct
a behavioral experiment to test our model’s predictions and
evaluate how our model accords with human curiosity. We
close with a discussion of the implications of our results.
Models of curiosity
A number of theories have been proposed in the past to de-
scribe the psychological processes involving curiosity. In this
section, we describe these theories in brief and provide their
individual strengths and weaknesses.
Curiosity based on novelty. Several psychological theo-
ries have linked curiosity with novelty by hypothesizing that
gaining information about novel stimuli is intrinsically re-
warding (Berlyne, 1950; Smock & Holt, 1962). Berlyne
(1960) called this “perceptual curiosity” and described it as
a driving force that motivates an organism to seek out novel
stimuli which diminishes with an increase in exposure. This
has also been supported by some neuroscientific studies that
show that novel stimuli activate reward-responsive areas in
the brain (Ranganath and Rainer, 2003; Du¨zel et al., 2010).
However, a severe limitation of this theory is that it assumes
that it is optimal for an individual to explore novel stimuli in
all environments. A novel stimulus doesn’t necessarily mean
that it contains information that is useful or generalizable to
an individual. This is also pointed out by previous studies
that show that exploration based only on novelty could lead
agents to be trapped in unlearnable situations (Gottlieb et al.,
2013).
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Curiosity based on information-gap. One of the most
popular theories of curiosity is the information-gap hypoth-
esis proposed by Loewenstein (1994). According to the
information-gap hypothesis, curiosity arises whenever an in-
dividual has a gap in information prompting it to complete its
knowledge and resolve the uncertainty. Thus, curiosity peaks
when one has a small amount of knowledge but it diminishes
when one knows too little or too much about the stimuli. A
number of studies have supported this prediction and showed
that curiosity is an inverted U-shaped function of confidence,
with people showing the highest curiosity for topics that they
were moderately confident about (Kang et al., 2009; Baranes,
Oudeyer, & Gottlieb, 2015). Berlyne (1960) called this form
of curiosity “epistemic curiosity” and described it as a drive
to acquire knowledge. While this theory has considerable
strengths, it is also constrained in that an individual can only
be curious about stimuli in known contexts. Thus, if an indi-
vidual has no prior knowledge about stimuli in the environ-
ment then it is not clear how curiosity will function in that
environment (as one will not be curious about any stimuli in
an environment that it has no prior knowledge of).
Curiosity based on learning progress. A third theory
concerning curiosity is guided by the hypothesis that learn-
ing progress generates intrinsic reward (Schmidhuber,1991;
Schmidhuber, 2010). This hypothesis proposes that the brain
is intrinsically motivated to pursue tasks in which one’s pre-
dictions are always improving. Thus, an individual will not
be interested in tasks that are too easy or too difficult to pre-
dict but will rather focus on tasks that are learnable. Based
on Schmidhuber’s framework, a number of papers in devel-
opmental robotics have supported this idea showing how an
agent can explore in an unknown environment (Oudeyer &
Kaplan, 2006; Oudeyer, Kaplan, & Hafner, 2007). While this
theory can probably describe some forms of curiosity, it is
again constrained in explaining curiosity in certain environ-
ments. For example, if an agent is ever present in an envi-
ronment that has many difficult tasks then it is not clear how
curiosity will work (as an agent will not be curious about any-
thing within that environment).
Summary and prospectus. While each of these theories
have their strengths, we first note that all the above theories
are concerned with describing how curiosity functions and
how it relates to different psychological factors. However,
none of these theories satisfactorily provide an explanation as
to why curiosity works the way it does. Second, we believe
that all these theories need not be in contention but are all
rather special cases of curiosity. As we will describe in the
rest of the paper, our rational model supports each of these
theories and unifies them in one common model.
Rational model of curiosity
In this section, we detail our rational model of curiosity. We
first consider the abstract computational problem underlying
curiosity and then formally derive an optimal solution to this
problem.
Computational problem underlying curiosity
Suppose that an agent is in an environment with n stimuli,
each of which provides a reward if the appropriate response is
produced. The goal of the agent is to decide what to explore
in the environment in order to maximize its knowledge and
hence maximize rewards in the future.
The environment determines the probability with which
each stimulus occurs in the environment. Let pk denote the
“need probability” that a stimulus k will occur in the future
(Anderson, 1990). Given this, the agent assigns a confidence
value ck to each stimulus in the environment. ck denotes the
probability the agent knows the correct response to the kth
stimulus. This probability increases at a decreasing rate with
respect to the number of exposures hk with that stimulus. hk
denotes the number of times the agent has been exposed to the
kth stimulus. For convenience, we describe the relationship
between c and h by a bounded growth function,
ck = 1− e−hk . (1)
However, our predictions hold for any monotonically increas-
ing function.
Next, the agent computes the value of its overall knowl-
edge. The value, denoted as V , is a function of the need prob-
ability p and the confidence factor c and is given as follows:
V =∑
k
pk.ck. (2)
According to this equation, the value of an agent’s knowl-
edge is simply the chance of successfully responding to the
next stimulus computed by summing over all stimuli in the
environment.
The goal of the agent is to increase the value of its current
knowledge V , which it can do so by taking actions to increase
h for the various stimuli in the environment. So the computa-
tional problem that the agent has to solve is choosing which
stimulus to explore further i.e. deciding which stimulus k to
increase hk for.
Deriving an optimal solution
To solve the problem of choosing which stimulus to explore
further, the agent can evaluate the change in V as it explores
each stimulus in the environment. Thus for every stimulus k
in the environment, the agent should compute the change in
its knowledge that would result from exploring that stimulus.
The stimulus that causes the largest increase in the overall
value should be explored first. This computation can be done
simply by differentiating V with respect to hk,
dV
dhk
= pk.
dck
dhk
. (3)
An agent operating according to this model will explore
stimuli that have a high rate of change of value w.r.t exposure
associated with them. This rate of change, i.e. dVdhk , is simply
the curiosity the agent has for knowing the kth item, which we
Figure 1: Relationship between need probability pk, exposure
hk, and confidence ck in different environmental structures.
Graph 1 shows an environment in which need probability is
related to exposure and subsequently confidence. Graph 2
shows an environment in which need probability is indepen-
dent of exposure and confidence.
denote as Ωk. The agent will explore stimuli in the environ-
ment that it is most curious about. In this way, curiosity helps
the agent to achieve its goal of maximizing its knowledge.
Under the choice of the form of ck given in Equation 1, we
calculate this derivative as follows:
Ωk = pk.
d(1− e−hk)
dhk
. (4)
Upon differentiation, we get the relationship of curiosity Ωk,
with respect to need probability pk and exposure hk as fol-
lows:
Ωk = pk.e−hk . (5)
Relationship to previous models
Having a formal account of curiosity, we now describe how
our model relates to previous theories of curiosity.
First, we note that in our rational model framework, two
different forms of environmental structure can exist. The first
form comes in when the agent is an environment where pk is
related to hk (as described in Graph 1, Figure 1). In this envi-
ronment, stimuli frequently encountered by an agent are more
likely to be needed in the future. Thus, the probability that
the agent will require a stimulus in the future determines the
number of times the agent is exposed to the stimulus which in
turn determines the confidence of the agent in knowing that
stimulus. The second form comes in when the agent is in an
environment where pk and hk are independent of each other
(as described in Graph 2, Figure 1). In this environment, the
agent can encounter any stimulus in the future regardless of
their previous occurrence.
Novelty based curiosity. According to theories that are
based on curiosity driven by novelty, an agent is most curious
about stimuli that it is least confident about:
Ωk = 1− ck. (6)
According to our rational model, when the agent is in an
environment where pk and hk are independent of each other
(as described in Graph 2, Figure 1), the relationship between
curiosity and exposure will be the one described in Equation
5 where pk is simply a constant value. Thus, curiosity is high-
est when exposure is lowest and it decreases as exposure in-
creases i.e. curiosity is highest for novel stimuli. The rela-
tionship between curiosity and confidence can be rewritten
as
Ωk = pk.(1− ck). (7)
If pk is equal for all k, this reduces to Equation 6. Thus,
when need probability and exposure are not related to each
other, our rational model is similar to the previously proposed
novelty based curiosity theory.
Information-gap hypothesis. When the agent is in an en-
vironment pk and hk are related to each other (as in Graph 1,
Figure 1), then pk is proportional to hk and the relationship
between curiosity and exposure given in Equation 5 reduces
to
Ωk ∝ hk.e−hk . (8)
Subsequently, using Equation 1, confidence will be related to
curiosity as
Ωk ∝− log(1− ck).(1− ck). (9)
Interestingly, this relationship between curiosity and con-
fidence is highly similar to the one described by the infor-
mation gap hypothesis. Loewenstein used Shannon’s (1948)
entropy formula to describe the relationship between curios-
ity and confidence as below:
Ωk =− log(ck).(ck). (10)
Both the information-gap theory and our model predict that
an inverted U-shape relationship exists between curiosity and
confidence. In this view, when an agent exists in an envi-
ronment where need probability is related to exposure, our
rational model relates to the information-gap theory.
Relationship to curiosity based on learning progress.
According to the learning progress hypothesis, an agent is in-
trinsically motivated to pursue tasks in which predictions are
constantly improving thereby avoiding boring or extremely
complicated tasks. An agent operating under this model ends
up exploring stimuli of “intermediate complexity”.
Our model proposes that an agent will explore stimuli that
maximize the value of its current knowledge. In an environ-
ment where need probability and exposure are related to each
other, then curiosity is highest for stimulus with moderate ex-
posure i.e. intermediate complexity (Equation 8 and 9). Thus,
Figure 2: Relationship between a) curiosity and exposure,
and b) curiosity and confidence in an environment where need
probability is related to exposure (Graph 1, Figure 1).
in this environment, an agent that aims to maximize its knowl-
edge behaves similarly to an agent whose curiosity is driven
by learning progress.
Summary. Whereas previous theories associated curios-
ity to factors such as novelty, knowledge gap, and learnability,
our model shows that depending on the structure of the envi-
ronment, an agent’s curiosity can be driven by any of these
factors. In this way, our rational model allows to bridge pre-
vious theories related to curiosity in a single framework. In
an environment where need probability and exposure are re-
lated, our rational model associates with the information gap
and learning progress hypothesis. In an environment where
need probability and exposure are not related, our model is
akin to the novelty-based theory of curiosity.
Empirical predictions
The rational model presented above makes two different em-
pirical predictions.
Prediction 1. The first prediction arises when the agent is
in an environment where the relationship between pk and hk
holds true (as in Graph 1, Figure 1). The relationship between
curiosity and exposure can be described using Equation 8 and
between curiosity and confidence using Equation 9. Thus,
Equation 8 predicts that an inverted U-shape relationship will
exist between curiosity and exposure and Equation 9 simi-
larly predicts that curiosity will be highest when the agent is
moderately confident about a stimulus (see Figure 2). We test
Figure 3: Relationship between a) curiosity and exposure,
and b) curiosity and confidence in an environment where need
probability is independent of exposure (Graph 2, Figure 1).
this prediction in the confidence sampling condition of our
behavioral experiment.
Note that this prediction fits the information gap and learn-
ing progress hypothesis which also predict an inverted U-
shape curve between curiosity and confidence. While several
studies have supported the existence of this U-shaped rela-
tionship, our model also predicts how to make this effect go
away as described in our second prediction.
Prediction 2. Our second prediction comes in when the
agent is in an environment where the relationship between pk
and hk no longer holds true (as described in Graph 2, Figure
1). Then the relationship between curiosity and exposure will
be the one described in Equation 5 and the relationship be-
tween curiosity and confidence will be that given in Equation
7. Equation 5 predicts that curiosity is highest when exposure
is lowest and it decreases as exposure increases. Similarly,
Equation 7 predicts that curiosity will be highest when con-
fidence is the lowest (also shown in Figure 3). We test this
prediction in the uniform sampling condition of the behav-
ioral experiment.
While this prediction accords with the prediction of the
novelty based hypothesis, that hypothesis can’t explain our
model’s first prediction. On the other hand, while the infor-
mation gap and learning progress hypothesis were in line with
our model’s first prediction, both of these theories fail to ex-
plain our model’s second prediction.
Testing the model predictions
This section details the behavioral experiment that was con-
ducted in order to test our model predictions. The experiment
used two different scenarios – confidence sampling and uni-
form sampling – to assess whether people’s curiosity is af-
fected by changes in the relationship between need probabil-
ity and confidence. In the confidence sampling condition, we
created an environment such that need probability was related
to confidence (Graph 1, Figure 1) and in the uniform sampling
condition they were independent of each other (Graph 2, Fig-
ure 1). Based on our model predictions, we hypothesize that
an inverted U-shape relation will exist between confidence
and curiosity in the confidence condition and a decreasing re-
lation will exist in uniform sampling condition.
Participants
We recruited 298 participants from Amazon Mechanical
Turk. They earned $1.50 for participation with the option of
earning an additional bonus of $0.80. Participants in the ex-
periment were randomly assigned to one of two conditions:
confidence sampling condition (163 participants) and uni-
form sampling condition (135 participants). Informed con-
sent was obtained using a consent form approved by the in-
stitutional review board at Berkeley.
Stimuli
The stimuli used in the experiment were 40 trivia questions on
various topics that were taken directly from Experiment 1 in
Kang et al. (2009). According to the authors, these questions
were designed to measure curiosity about semantic knowl-
edge and evoke a range of curiosity levels.
Procedure
The experiment was divided into two phases – the main round
and bonus round. The main round was used to elicit and
measure curiosity in participants. Participants were shown 40
trivia questions one after another and were asked to rate their
confidence (i.e., probability that they know the correct an-
swer) and curiosity in knowing the correct answer. Curiosity
ratings were on a scale from 1 to 7 and the confidence scale
ranged from 0 to 100%. Following Kang et al.’s methodol-
ogy, the raw curiosity ratings were individually normalized
and confidence was rescaled to range from 0 to 1. The order
of trivia questions was randomized for each participant. Thus,
the main round of the experiment followed the procedure of
Kang et al.’s design closely. This part of the experiment took
approximately 7-8 minutes to complete.
After the main round, the bonus round began which con-
sisted of two parts. In the first part, all 40 questions from the
main round were shown one after another and participants
could choose to reveal the answer to those questions. How-
ever, each time they chose to reveal an answer, they had to
wait an extra 10 seconds for the next question to appear. Find-
ings from Experiment 3 of Kang et al. (2009) showed that
participants were more likely to spend time, to wait longer,
for the answers that they were more curious about. Thus,
requiring participants to spend time to obtain information
served as a proxy to measure their curiosity.
In the second part, participants attempted to answer 10
questions that were sampled from the main round ($0.08
bonus for each correct answer). To discourse participants
from using Google or other search engines, they were only
given 2 minutes in total to answer the questions.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were ran-
domly assigned to two conditions – the confidence and the
uniform condition. Both the conditions had the same main
round as described above but used different sampling meth-
ods for the bonus round. In the confidence condition, the sam-
pling in bonus round was done based on the confidence rat-
ings provided by the participants i.e. the questions for which
participant’s confidence rating was higher were more likely to
appear in the second part of the bonus round. In the uniform
condition, this sampling procedure was completely random
i.e. each question was equally likely to appear in second part
of the bonus round. Critically, participants were informed
about the sampling procedure for their respective condition
before the beginning of the bonus round. In a sense, the con-
fidence condition creates a situation in which confidence is
related to need probability (Graph 1 in Figure 1) and the uni-
form condition breaks this relationship (Graph 2 in Figure 1).
According to our model’s predictions we should see an in-
verted U-shape between curiosity and confidence for both the
conditions in the main round. However, the curiosity of par-
ticipants (i.e. the answers they revealed) should be differ-
ent for both conditions in the bonus round. For the confi-
Figure 4: Relationship of curiosity and confidence in the main
round for a) confidence condition and b) uniform condition.
The markers indicate mean curiosity at each confidence level
and the solid curve is the regression line. Curiosity is an
inverted-U function of confidence for both conditions.
dence condition participants’ probability of revealing an an-
swer should be highest for questions which they were moder-
ately confident about. On the other hand, in the uniform con-
dition, participants should be most curious about questions
for which they were least confident about.
Results
For all analyses that follow, we removed participants that re-
vealed either too little (<3) or too many answers (>37) in the
bonus round. 78 participants were excluded based on this cri-
terion and our final data consisted of 220 participants (118 in
the confidence condition and 102 in the uniform condition).
Main Round. Consistent with our prediction, an inverted
U-shape exists between curiosity and confidence for both
Figure 5: Probability of participants revealing an answer as
a function of confidence in the bonus round. Consistent with
our model’s prediction, an inverted U-shape exists between
curiosity and confidence in the confidence condition and a
decreasing relationship exists in the uniform condition.
conditions (Figure 4). Following the method of Kang et al.,
we fitted curiosity with confidence and uncertainty i.e. con-
fidence × (1-confidence) for both conditions. For the con-
fidence condition, the model provided r = 0.2 and a signifi-
cant coefficient for uncertainty (estimate = 2.01, p < 0.001).
For the uniform condition, the model provided similar results
with r = 0.2 and significant coefficient for uncertainty (esti-
mate = 2.12, p < 0.001). Thus, for both conditions, the model
provided a significant quadratic coefficient thereby demon-
strating the prevalence of an inverted U-shape between cu-
riosity and confidence for both conditions.
Bonus Round. We first computed the probability of par-
ticipants revealing an answer conditioned on the confidence
rating for both the conditions. As per our model’s predictions,
an inverted U-shape exists for the confidence condition and a
decreasing relationship exists for the uniform condition (Fig-
ure 5). Similar to the previous analysis, we fitted confidence
and uncertainty to both the conditions. For the confidence
condition, the model provided r = 0.9 and a significant coef-
ficient for both confidence and uncertainty (estimates = -0.15
and 0.53 respectively with p < 0.05 for both) thereby show-
ing a U-shape relationship. For the uniform condition, the
model provided r = 0.91 but the coefficient for uncertainty
was not significant (p = 0.09). On the other hand, the coef-
ficient for confidence was significant (estimate = -0.23, p <
0.001), implying a decreasing relationship of curiosity with
confidence for the uniform condition.
Discussion
Curiosity is one of the hallmarks of human intelligence and
is crucial to scientific discovery and invention. Models
of curiosity have previously explained human curiosity by
linking it to various psychological factors such as novelty,
information-gap, and learning progress. We have shown that
these different models are all special cases of curiosity — de-
pending on the environment, curiosity can be driven by any of
these factors. Along with providing a way to unify previous
distinct mechanistic accounts of curiosity, our rational model
explains human curiosity in various settings.
Our results suggest that human curiosity is not only sensi-
tive to the properties of the stimuli but it is also affected by
the nature of the environment. If people are in an environ-
ment where need probability influences exposure, then their
curiosity is highest for stimuli for which they are moderately
confident about. On the other hand, if need probability and
exposure are independent of each other then curiosity is high-
est for novel stimuli, i.e. stimuli for which people have little
confidence. This can have important implications in the con-
text of education where researchers are concerned with ways
to pique curiosity in students. If we want to make people cu-
rious about tasks or activities for which they have little con-
fidence in, perhaps subtle changes in the structure of the en-
vironment might be a step towards achieving that. We intend
to explore such possibilities in future work, building upon the
foundation established in this paper and working towards a
better understanding of how to make people more curious es-
pecially in pedagogical settings.
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